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Abstract
In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the
landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their
two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum
of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend
the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs
and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country
gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilib-
rium which is immune to protable gradual deviations always exists.
We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger con-
cept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong
Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the class of strategic environments covered by the land-
scape theoryintroduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993) (AB  henceforth).
In the landscape setting the actors (countries) are partitioned into two mu-
tually exclusive blocs on the basis of their propensity to work together with
other players on bilateral basis. All players rank groups according to the sum
of her individual evaluations of all members of the group. In this sense the
AB approach to international interactions is related to Bueno de Mesquita
(1975, 1981) who constructed a proximity matrix for every pair of nations
based on history of their defense cooperation.
Each actor i is characterized by the value of her size/strength/inuence
parameter si. For each pair of countries i and j there is a parameter pij (pos-
itive or negative), the value of which represents the propensity for collabora-
tion between i and j. Thus, the data of the model consists of a n-dimensional
vector of countriesstrength parameters and an n  n matrix P of pairwise
proximity coe¢ cients.
For an arbitrary partition of all countries into two blocs, AB dene the
frustration of a country i as the sum of the proximity coe¢ cients pij for
all members outside her bloc weighted by their strength parameter sj. Ob-
viously, the country frustration will be reduced if it avoids countries with
whom it has a strong negative propensity to align. The energy of any two-
bloc partition is then determined as the sum of individual frustrations of all
countries weighted by their size. The objective of the theory is to identify
the congurations that yield, as they call it, a local and global minimum
of energy. To attain these outcomes, AB used the incremental or gradual
approach by allowing single countries to switch their membership, one at a
time, to generate a new conguration with the reduced energy level. As-
suming the symmetry of the proximity matrix P , i.e. pij = pji for all pairs
of players i; j, AB showed that for any initial bloc structure, the sequential
gradual reduction of energy does not contain cycles and is terminated when
a stable conguration is attained. Note that the symmetry of the proximity
matrix P is essential to obtain stable congurations. Indeed, consider a game
with two players, where player 1 prefers to join player 2, i.e., p12 > 0, whereas
player 2 would like to avoid being together with 1, i.e., p21 < 0. The game
obviously does not admit a stable partition, as the partition in two groups
would be challenged by player 1, while the creation of a two-country bloc
would be rejected by player 2.
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AB provide a spectacular application of the landscape theory to Euro-
pean alliances prior to World War II. By using the Correlates of War data
and estimating the propensity for cooperation based on ethnic and border
conicts, history, etc., AB calibrate a matrix P to conclude that that there
were two stable congurations. One is the expected partition to the Axis
and Allies of World War II, while the other separates USSR, Yugoslavia and
Greece from the rest of Europe! Axelrod et al. (1995) also illustrate and test
the landscape theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies
to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing UNIX operating system
standards in 1988.
Even though AB have not done that explicitly, it is straightforward to
present their setting in game-theoretical terms. Each actor i is a player with
two available pure strategies corresponding to two blocs, X and Y , and her
payo¤ function is represented by her frustration level derived from the two-
bloc partition. Thus, after minor adjustments, proper reformulation, and
clarications, AB in fact show the existence of a pure strategies Nash equi-
librium in landscape games. As Bennett (2000, p. 51) points out: "A local
optimum is dened as a conguration for which every adjacent conguration
has higher (worse) energy. When the system reaches one of those points,
no further improvement in energy is possible given a single step (change of
coalition by one actor). This optimum is akin to a Nash equilibrium in game
theory, wherein no single actor can improve its own payo¤ by choosing a
di¤erent move." Interestingly enough, the AB energy function E could be
viewed as a potential, so that symmetric landscape games belong to the class
of potential games examined by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Notice that landscape games belong to the class of hedonic games pio-
neered by Banerjee, Konishi and Somnez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jack-
son (2002). Hedonic games are coalition formation games, where the pay-
o¤ of any player depends solely upon the composition of the coalition to
which she belongs, and a strategic choice made by the coalition does not im-
pact its memberspayo¤s. This is the case for landscape games, where each
player possesses a precise evaluation of every potential partner and then
ranks groups according to the sum of her individual evaluations of all mem-
bers of the group she may join. In the case of equal values of the strength
parameter si for all countries, this model belongs to the class of additively
separable games in Banerjee, Konishi and Somnez (2001). By constructing
a potential function, as in AB, Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) show that
the symmetric additively separable hedonic games, including the landscape
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games, admit a Nash stable conguration.
In this paper, we consider the class of landscape games that expands the
AB framework in two aspects. First, we allow for an arbitrary number of
blocs to form, without limiting ourselves to two-bloc congurations.1 The
congurations with more than two blocs have a place in various environments.
In fact, during the Cold War between East and West that followed the end
of the World War II, an important role has been played by the third bloc
of non-aligned countries. And nowdays, when the world is often described
as a multi-polar environment, the study of multi-bloc settings becomes even
more relevant. Another distinction with regard to the AB model is that we
expand the notion of incremental or gradual deviations in AB. AB allowed
for individual countries to switch their bloc membership, one at a time. In
the same time the right of any country to deviate could not be permanently
denied. In our framework we take the gradual approach further by allowing
several countries to switch their blocs at the same time. However, the cost of
absorption of new members from di¤erent blocs could be quite high. Thus, a
switch will be allowed only for a subgroup from one bloc to another. We call
such a deviation gradual and dene a landscape equilibrium as a conguration
immune to gradual deviations. Note that individual deviations are obviously
allowed under the umbrella of gradualism.
Our main result shows that, under the symmetry assumption, there is a
landscape equilibrium. Moreover, there exists a Pareto optimal landscape
equilibium under which there is no other strategy prole to yield at least the
same utility for all players, with a strictly higher utility level for, at least,
one player. It is important to underscore that the existence of a Pareto op-
timal landscape equilibrium rules out an emergence of prisoners dilemma
where countries acting in their own self-interests do not produce the opti-
mal outcome. Interestingly, some aspects of Pareto optimality have been
discussed by AB, who searched for the global optimum as the lowest en-
ergy level of any conguration. Since the concept of landscape equilibrium is
stronger than Nash equilibrium, our result reconrms the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in the landscape games. On the other hand, we also consider a
more demanding notion of strong Nash equilibrium introduced by Aumann
(1959), which requites immunity against any deviation by any group of play-
ers. However, as is implied by the result in Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez
1See Florian and Galam (2000) for a discussion on a three-bloc extension of the land-
scape theory.
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(2001), a strong Nash equilibrium in landscape games may fail to exist. Thus,
the unrestricted extension of the set of feasible deviations not only violates
the concept of gradualism, but also diminishes the likelihood of obtaining a
meaningful existence result.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we o¤er a brief
review of the literature. In Section 3 we present a model and state our result
on existence of a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium. In Section 4 we
discuss the links of our equilibrium concept with other modications of Nash
equilibrium. The proof of the main result is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper has roots in two branches of the existing literature. On one hand,
as pointed out above, it belongs to the research area on hedonic games. The
specicity of landscape games is that players compare coalitions of partners
on the basis of pairwise evaluations2. The more distant is a player from her
potential partner in a coalition, the less likely are the prospects of their co-
operation. In the international relations setting Bueno de Mesquita (1975,
1981) constructed a matrix that captures the proximity between pairs of na-
tions according to their alliances on defense issues and dened indicators of
tightnesswhich are used as a key determinant to evaluate the war proneness
of the international system. Le Breton and Weber (1994) consider such a set-
ting in the case where only a two-player coalitions can be formed. Desmet
et al. (2011) consider a nation formation game where pairwise hedonic het-
erogeneity is described by the matrix of genetic distances between nations as
calculated by scholars in population genetics.
On the other hand, our paper is related to the literature on congestion
games. Indeed, when all non-diagonal entries pij are negative, we obtain
a congestion game, where all individuals are negatively impacted by the
presence of others in their coalition3. Any such congestion game belongs to
the class of games considered by Quint and Shubik (1994), Milchtaich (1996)
2This is di¤erent from other assumptions like, for instance, the one considered by
Milchtaich andWinter (2002) and Kukushkin (2019). They consider instead hedonic games
where each player, characterized by a one-dimensional parameter (status), evaluates every
potential group on the basis of the status values of its members.
3Obviously, if all o¤-diagonal entries of the matrix D are positive, the unique Nash
equilibrium (and therefore strong Nash equilibrium) is the grand coalition.
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and Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a,b) who prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for anonymous congestion games. For the
latter class of games Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a), in fact, show the
existence of a strong Nash equilibrium. Rosentahl explores a di¤erent class
of anonymous congestion games. On one hand, it is more general since the
players do not have the set of strategies (a strategy is a path in a network).
The payo¤ of a player is dened as the sum of her payo¤s on each segment
of the path that she ultimately selects. Rosenthal assumes that on any given
segment, the payo¤s of the players who have access to that segment in their
strategy set are identical, and proves that any game in his class is a potential
game, and, thus, admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Rosentahl
was the rst to introduce this notion which was later systematically explored
by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Note that the Nash equilibrium does not
need to be strong. To address this point, Holzman and Law-Yone (1997)
introduce the notion of strong potential and obtain conditions on the network
that guarantee the existence of a strong Nash equilibria. This topic is further
explored in Voorneveld et al. (1999) and Harks, Klimm and Möhring (2013).
Finally, we would like to point out that strong Nash equilibria has received
recently a lot of attention in algorithmic game theory, see, e.g., Andelman,
Feldman and Mansour (2009), Chien and Sinclair (2009), Epstein, Feldman
and Mansour (2009) who compute strong versions of the price of anarchy for
various classes of games.
3 The Model and The Result
The landscape game  0 is dened as follows. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a
nite set of players. Each player i is associated with the positive value si
which represents her inuence, or in the case of countries, the population
size or military power. For every pair of players i and j in N there is a value
pij (positive or negative) that represents the strength of ties between i and j
and their benet of being members of the same coalition. It is assumed that
this value is symmetric for every pair i and j, i.e., pij = pji with pii = 0 for
every player i. The data on pairwise propensities is therefore represented by
the symmetric n n matrix P .
The set of alternatives X = fx1; : : : ; xmg is common for all players. Each
player i 2 N chooses an alternative xi 2 X.4 Two players i and j belong
4The lower and upper indices indicate players and alternatives, respectively. The ex-
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to the same bloc if xi = xj. A vector of playerschoices x = (x1; : : : ; xn)
generates the partition G(x) of the set N , which consists of no more than m
non-empty blocs. We denote Gi(x) 2 G(x) the bloc that contains player i.
The payo¤ U0i (x), i 2 N , of each player solely depends upon the bloc to
which she belongs5. More specically, in the landscape theory setting, we
assume that
U0i (x) =
X
j2Gi(x)
pijsj: (1)
We shall analyze the stability of emerging bloc formations. To do so, we
need to examine a threat of feasible deviations. For a given strategy prole
x, a group of players S would deviate if each member i of S would switch to
another bloc, while raising her utility. Formally.
Denition 1 - Deviation: Let a strategy prole x = fx1; : : : ; xng be given.
A (feasible) deviation from x by a group of players S is a prole
x0 =
fx0igi2S; fxigi62S	 consisting of new choices for players in S
and unaltered choices for the rest of the players. It is protable if:
U0i (x
0) > U0i (x) for all i 2 S;
However, in our setting, as in many others, one needs to impose some
restrictions on feasible deviations. The coordination challenges, switching
costs and other factors may limit the size and the composition of deviating
groups. In fact, AB argued for need for incrementalism and allowed only for
one single actor to switch bloc. Thus, we rst consider the case where the
only feasible deviating coalitions are singletones. It immediately leads to the
notion of Nash equilibrium.
Denition 2: Nash equilibrium: A strategic prole x = fx1; : : : ; xng is
a Nash equilibrium if for all i 2 N , there is no protable deviation from
x by an individual in N .
Following AB, we impose severe limitations on the range of possible devia-
tions. However, we allow for a wider set of deviations than simply singletons.
pression xi 2 X means that there is xk 2 X such that xi = xk:
5Note that in our paper, we use a more common notion of utility rather than frusta-
tion. The utility maximization and the frustration minimization are, obviously, equivalent
objectives.
8
In our view, the essence of deviation costs in the landscape theory boils down
to the absorption cost of a bloc incurred by the acceptance of new members.
Thus, we allow only for subgroups of a bloc to switch to another bloc. We
rule out the situations where members from two blocs, say, A and B, join
another bloc C. It goes along the lines of gradual approach supported by
AB. It is important to point out that no country should be prevented from
switching to a bloc of its choice. What we examine here is the rst stage of
possible realignment process.
Denition 3: Gradualism and Landscape Equilibrium: Let a strategy
prole x = fx1; : : : ; xng be given. Assume that a strategy x0 represents
a deviation from x by a group of players S. The deviation is called
gradual if the following condition is satised for every of two players i
and j in S:
(GR) If i; j 2 S and x0i = x0j then xi = xj:
A prole x is called a landscape equilibrium if it does not allow a prof-
itable gradual deviation.
In addition to landscape equilibrium, we introduce the notions of a strong
Nash equilibrium (Aumann (1959)), which is immune against an unrestricted
set of coalitional deviations.
Denition 4: Strong Nash Equilibrium: A strategy prole x = fx1; : : : ; xng
is a strong Nash equilibrium if for all S  N , there there is no protable
deviation from x by group S.
We have our main result:
Theorem 1: The game  0 admits a landscape equilibrium, which is strongly
Pareto optimal.6
The proof of the Theorem is relegated to the Appendix.
6A prole x is strongly Pareto optimal if there is no other strategy prole y such that
U0i (y)  U0i (x) for all i 2 N with a strict inequality for at least one i.
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4 Comments
Let usrst o¤er some comments on the connection between landscape equilib-
ria and the two other equilibrium notions introduced above. First, the notion
of gradual deviation in Denition 3 is stronger than individual deviations,
and, therefore, the set of landscape equilibria is smaller than the set of Nash
equilibria. Thus, Theorem 1 yields the existence of a Nash equilibrium as
well. The following example shows that, in general, the sets of landscape and
Nash equilibria do not coincide, and a Nash equilibrium does not necessarily
constitute a landscape equilibrium.
Example: Consider the game  0 with four players and two alternatives (n =
4;m = 2). The inuence parameter si is assumed to be equal to 1 for
all players, and the distance matrix P is given by:
P =
0BB@
0 1000  100  50
1000 0  100  50
 100  100 0  400
 50  50  400 0
1CCA
It is easy to see that the strategy prole fa; a; a; bg is a Nash equilib-
rium. However, players 1 and 2 would benet by switching to b and
joining player 4. By Denition 3, it is a protable gradual deviation,
and this prole is not a landscape equilibrium. Notice that in this
example the prole fa; a; b; ag is a landscape equilibrium.
Similarly, the notion of gradual deviation is weaker than the unrestricted
notion of deviation utilized at strong Nash equilibrium. Thus, the set of
landscape equilibria is larger than the set of Nash equilibria. However, in
the case of two blocs (m = 2), a threat of gradual deviation is vacuous, and
the sets of landscape equilibria and strong Nash equilibria coincide. Thus,
Theorem 1 yields the existence of a strong Nash equilibria in the case of two
blocs (see Dower at al. (2020)). We would like to complete this section by
pointing out that in the case, where the number of alternatives m exceeds
the number of players n, the set of strong Nash equilibria is nonempty if
and only if the set of core stable congurations in the Banerjee, Konishi
and Sonmez (2001) model.7 Thus, their example of nonexistence of a core
7Even though they do not explicitly include a set of alternatives.
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stable conguration yields the nonexistence of a strong Nash equilibria in
our model. The latter conclusion reinforces the importance of examination
of landscape equilibria.
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Appendix
This section contains the proof of Theorem 1. We rst modify the game  0
and construct a potential function P over the set of all strategies proles.
We then show that its maximum cannot be improved upon via gradual de-
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viations. Due do the niteness of our game, a maximum exists, and, thus,
represents a landscape equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1: For each player i 2 N multiply the utility function
U0i by is own inuence parameter si:
siU
0
i (x) =
X
j2Gi(x)
pijsisj:
While this modication does not alter the equilibrium structure of the game,
it makes the summation term pijsisj symmetric in i and j: pijsisj = pjisjsi:
We therefore dene the game   that di¤ers from  0 only with respect to in-
dividual utility functions, that, with some abuse of notation, are represented
as
Ui(x) =
X
j2Gi(x)
pij: (2)
It su¢ ces to prove that the game   admits a landscape equilibrium. As we
indicated above, the proof relies on the introduction of the utilitarian social
welfare function P (x)  Pi2N Ui (x), which is a landscape strong potential
in the following sense: If there is a gradual deviation of group S from x to
x0 in game   , then P (x0) > P (x).
Let us introduce an additional assumption on feasible coalitional devia-
tions. The deviation of group S from x via x0 is feasible if
(G) for any i; j 2 S the equality xi = xj implies x0i = x0j.
Condition (G) means that in order for deviation to be feasible, the de-
viating members of the same bloc should stay together in the new bloc as
well.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds in three steps. First, by constructing
a potential function we show the existence of a strategy prole which is
immune against deviations that satisfy not only (GR) but also (G). Second,
we demonstrate that condition (G) can be suspended with, which guarantees
the existence of a landscape equilibrium. Finally, the choice of the landscape
equilibrium as a maximizer of the total payo¤ function completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1 Let ~x be a maximum of the function P (x) over the set of all
strategy proles. Then there is no group S and prole x0 such that S protably
deviates from ~x via x0 while satisfying (GR) and (G).
Proof: Let ~x be the maximum of the function P (x) over the set of all
strategy proles. A maximum exists given that the set of alternatives is
nite. Playerschoices at the maximum induce the partition of the set N
onto m (not necessarily nonempty) coalitions. Each such coalition, denoted
by Gj(~x), j = 1; : : : ;m, consists of players i 2 N who choose the strategy
~xi = x
j in X.
Assume, to the contrary, that there is a coalition S  N and strategy
choices x0i; i 2 S such that S protably deviates from ~x via x0 in line with
(GR) and (G), where x0 =
fx0igi2S; fxigi62S	.
For every pair of alternatives xk 6= xl in X denote by T kl  S the set of
players who changed their choice from xk to xl. Then there are (at most)
m(m  1) such groups. For every xk 2 X denote three sets of players :
Qk  those who left the bloc that chose xk at ~x: Qk = [l 6=kT kl;
Rk  those who choose xk at x0 but not at ~x: Rk = [l 6=kT lk;
	k  those who choose xk at both x0 and ~x.
Note that 	k = Gk(~x)nQk. Since each player from T kl  S increases her
payo¤ by switching from xk to xl, it follows that
Ui(x
0)  Ui(~x) > 0 (3)
for all i 2 T kl.
To simplify the notation, we introduce the mapping (; ) : NN  ! <
for every two subsets N1 and N2 of N as follows:
(N1; N2) =
X
i2N1
X
j2N2
pij:
In particular, for every i 2 N and a strategy prole x we have
(fig; Gi(x)) =
X
j2Gi(x)
pij = Ui(x) (4)
(recall thatGi is the set of players who share the choice of player i). Moreover,
the symmetry of D induces the symmetry of :
(N1; N2) = (N2; N1): (5)
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In addition, for every triple N1; N2; N3  N , we have
(N1; N2 [N3) = (N1; N2) + (N1; N3) (6)
We extend the notation (N1; N2) to the case of N1 = ; or / and N2 = ; by
assigning (;; N2) = (N1; ;) = (;; ;) = 0.
Let player i switch from xk to xl. Then combining observation (6) with
the decompositions
Gk(~x) = 	k [mr=1;r 6=k T kr and Gl(x0) = 	l [mq=1;q 6=l T ql;
we rewrite inequality (3) in the following way:
(fig;	l [mq=1;q 6=l T ql)  (fig;	k [mr=1;r 6=k T kr) > 0 for all i 2 T kl: (7)
Summing up inequalities (7) over all i 2 T kl, we have
(T kl;	l [mq=1;q 6=l T ql) > (T kl;	k [mr=1;r 6=k T kr): (8)
By using the properties (5) and (6) of  and cancelling out the identical
terms, we expand the last inequality to obtain:
(T kl;	l) +
mX
q=1;q 6=l
(T kl; T ql) > (T kl;	k) +
mX
r=1;r 6=k
(T kl; T kr): (9)
Condition (GR) does not allow players from two di¤erent blocs at ~x to join
the same bloc at x0, i. e., either T kl or T ql is empty set for each pair (T kl; T ql),
q = 1; : : : ;m, q 6= l, q 6= k. The corresponding terms (T kl; T ql) are equal
to zero. In the same way, according to (G), (T kl; T kr) = 0, r = 1; : : : ;m,
r 6= l, r 6= k. Therefore, (9) is simplied to
(T kl;	l) > (T kl;	k): (10)
There are m(m  1)  1 (not necessarily nonempty) other groups of players
from S that alter their strategies and raise their payo¤ by shifting from ~x to
x0. Summing up all inequalities (10) obtained for di¤erent pairs (k; l) we end
up with
X
i2S
 
Ui(x
0)  Ui(~x)

=
mX
q=1
 
(Rq;	q)  (Qq;	q) > 0: (11)
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Now we evaluate the di¤erence of the potential at the two points that
represent the playerschoices before and after the deviation:
P (~x)  P (x0) =
mX
q=1
(	q [Qq;	q [Qq) 
mX
q=1
(	q [Rq;	q [Rq):
Once more, the symmetry property (5) is applied and the terms (	q;	q)
are cancelled out. Then
P (~x) P (x0) =
mX
q=1
 
2(Qq;	q)+(Qq; Qq)
  mX
q=1
 
2(Rq;	q)+(Rq; Rq)

:
(12)
The conditions (GR) and (G) allow us to conclude that
mX
q=1
(Qq; Qq) 
mX
q=1
(Rq; Rq) = 0: (13)
Indeed, each (non-empty) Rq consists of a single sub-group T kq: for any
q = 1; : : : ;m there is k = k(q): Rq = T kq (the existence of the second sub-
group would violate condition (GR)). According to (G), each Qq also consists
of a single sub-group T ql: for any q = 1; : : : ;m there is l = l(q): Qq = T ql.
Thus, the both sums in (13) consist of the same terms. From (12) and (13)
it follows that
P (~x)  P (x0) = 2
mX
q=1
 
(Qq;	q)  (Rq;	q): (14)
Combining (11) and (14), we conclude that
P (~x)  P (x0) = 2
X
i2S
(Ui(~x)  Ui(x0)) < 0:
This contradicts the fact that the point ~x maximizes the function P and
completes the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we rst show that the prole ~x,
which is a maximum of the function P , represents a landscape equilibrium.
Suppose, it is not a landscape equilibrium. Then there is a group S^ of
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players with strategies x^i; i 2 S^; such that S deviates from ~x via x^, where
x^ =
fx^igi2S^; f~xjgj 62S^	. Moreover, S^ satises (GR) but not (G).
Take a player i 2 S^. Let T = fj 2 S^ : x^j = x^i; g be the set of players
in S^ who choose the same bloc as i does at x^. We dene a strategy prole
x00 generated by the deviation of the coalition T from the strategy prole ~x,
namely, x00 =
fx^igi2T ; f~xjgj 62T	. Then
Ui(x
00) = Ui(x^)
for all i 2 T . Indeed, the utility of player i after deviation depends on the
players who make the same choice x^i at x00. These players are divided into
two groups: (i) those who chose x^i at both proles, ~x and x00, and (ii) those
who alter original choice for x^i. By (GR), the second group consists solely of
the players who have chosen the strategy ~xi of the player i at ~x. Note that
the condition (G) holds for T . But since
Ui(x
00) = Ui(x^) > Ui(~x); i 2 T:
it contradicts the statement of Lemma 1 on nonexistence of a protable
deviation that satises condition (G).
Finally, the choice of ~x as a maximizer of the function P (x) over the set
of all strategy proles guarantees that ~x is strongly Pareto optimal. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
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